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STATE CRIMINAL CONFESSION CASES:
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CASES
REVERSED BY U S' SUPREME COURT AND
SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS*
WiLFRED J. Rrrz-
In the past quarter century the U. S. Supreme Court has reviewed
thirty-one cases, not counting denials of petitions for certiorari, in-
volving state convictions allegedly based on the use of involuntary
confessions in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court reversed twenty-two convictions and affirmed
nine.1 This article will describe the subsequent developments in the
twenty-two cases reversed by the Supreme Court and consider some
current problems in state criminal prosecutions involving confes-
sions.
When the Supreme Court in 1936 for the first time in Brown v.
Missjssippi2 reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had been violated
by the admission of an involuntary confession into evidence, it may well
have been influenced by the then recently issued Wickersham Report,
in which it had been said that "the third degree-that is, the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
confessions or admissions-is widespread."3 Explicit note was taken
of this report in Chambers v. Florida, decided four years later.
4
The Wickersham Report provided the authoritative showing that
a need existed in the 193o's to eliminate the third degree in law en-
forcement, a need which the U. S. Supreme Court undertook to meet
by reviewing state confession cases, and, where appropriate, reversing
*The first part of this article was published in 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35
(1962) under the title, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
tProfessor of Law, Washington and Lee Umversity, Lexington, Va.
"Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court, i9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35, 35-36 (1962). This survey covers cases through
the i96o Term. The Supreme Court reviewed one state confession case during
the 1961 Term, reversing a Colorado conviction of murder. Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (a962).
2297 U.S. 278 (i936).
3National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Law-
lessness in Law Enforcement 4 (1931).
'309 U.S. 227, 238 n.ii and 24o n.15 (1940).
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state convictions. It is less easy to justify the continued reliance on the
Wickersham Report as the principal, virtually the sole, empirical
evidence demonstrating that the third degree is still used in law en-
forcement so that there is a continuing need for Supreme Court re-
view of state criminal convictions allegedly based on the use of coerced
confessions. 5
The United States Civil Rights Commission 6 relies heavily on
the Wickersham Report for its finding that the third degree is an evil
in the United States in 1961,7 and beyond this single 1931 report the
Commission points to little in the way of unimpeachable evidence of
present widespread. use of the third degree. About the only data the
Commission educes are two convictions under the Civil Rights Act s
of police chiefs for violating the civil rights of accused persons by
obtaining confessions by the use of physical violence;9 a hearsay state-
ment by the Alabama Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commis-
sion that "police in their area allegedly have been known to make use
of force and intimidation in order to extort confessions from prison-
ers"; 10 and self-serving complaints made by inmates of New Jersey pris-
ons in interviews with an investigator." Although the Civil Rights
Commission found no evidence of racial discrimination in the use of
the third degree to obtain confessions, 12 on the basis of this sketchy evi-
dence the Commission concluded, "Police brutality-the unnecessary
use of violence to enfore the mores of segregation, to punish, and to
coerce confessions-is a serious problem in the United States."13
1E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 and 579 n-17 (1962).
61961 United States Civil Rights Commission Report No. 5, Justice.
71d. at 16.
818 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
OPool v. United States, 26o F.2d 57, 59-63 (9th Cir. 1958). The report of this
case indicates that after being coerced by physical violence into confessing, the
accused persons pleaded guilty in the state court to the burglaries charged against
them, and they were sentenced to confinement for from one to fifteen years, sen-
tences afterwards commuted to ten months. United States v. Lowery, Crim. No.
13,235 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1958), Report of the Attorney General of the United
States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 3o, 1958, at 177.
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), also involved a conviction under
the Civil Rights Act for brutality in obtaining confessions. However, the defen-
dant was a special policeman hired by a lumber company to ascertain the identity
of theives, a somewhat different situation from that in which duly organized law
enforcement agencies use the third degree to obtain confessions.
"Justice, supra note 6, at 17 n.68.
UTrebach, Defendants and Defenders, discussed in Justice, supra note 6, at 18.
"Justice, supra note 6, i6-18.
21d. at 28. Literally, this definition of police brutality sanctions the use of vio-
lence if necessary to obtain a confession.
1962]
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Physical torture was involved in Brown v. Mississippi, the first
coerced confession case. Since 1936 when that case was decided, there
have been no others reaching the Supreme Court in which the Court
has found as a fact that physical violence had been used,14 although
the question is raised in the state courts with a fair degree of fre-
quency.' 5 This fact may give rise to quite different inferences.
It could be argued that the Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Mississippi was extraordinarily effective, and that state courts taking
it to heart have faithfully applied the decision so that convictions
based on confessions obtained by physical violence are being re-
versed at the state level, without any reaching the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, it is also possible that Brown v. Mississippi was
something of a freak, a unique case of physical violence that slipped
through the state judicial screen. Prior to the Brown decision, Missis-
sippi had reversed convictions based on confessions obtained by phy-
sical violence.' 6 Other states were following the same rule.' 7
It is also possible that law enforcement officials, forewarned by the
Brown decision, have developed techniques that are more or less ef-
fective in concealing the use of physical violence to obtain confessions.
It is always possible to claim that the evidences of physical violence
were present when the accused was taken into custody or that they are
the result of the defendant's own actions in seeking to escape from
custody.' 8 In any event, under the self-imposed "uncontradicted facts"
rule being followed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the police can, by tes-
tifying falsely and denying ,the use of physical violence, sterilize the de-
"'Justice, supra note 6, at 17 and n.66, says: "It is noteworthy that, with two
exceptions, all Supreme Court confession cases since 1942 have involved psychologi-
cal coercion alone." It is not clear why the" Commission uses the date 1942, rather
than 1936 when Brown was decided, as a starting point. The two exceptions cited
are Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165 (1952), and Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
Rochin involved the use of a stomach pump to recover narcotics swallowed by
the defendant, but no involuntary verbal confession, and so the case is not in
point. In Reck v. Pate there -was a claim of physical violence, but the opinion of
the Supreme Court was expressly based on the premise "that the officers did not
inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held
him in their custody." 367 U.S. at 440.
1Supplements to the annotation, Confession by one who has been subjected to
or threatened with physical suffering, 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923). The A.L.R. Blue Book
of Supplemental Decisions, 1946-1952 (Permanent Vol. 2, 1952) lists 47 state cases;
the 1952-1958 supplement (Permanent Vol. 3, 1958) lists 27 cases; the 1962 supple-
ment lists ii cases.
"2White v. Mississippi, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903 (1922).
The cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923).
2BE.g., Pool v. United States, supra note 9.
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fendant's claim so that it will not be open to review in that court.19
The haunting feeling remains, though, that in spite of disclaimers and
the uncontradicted facts rule, disputed claims, particularly of physical
violence, do influence the Court's judgment, on the basis of the old
adage that where there is smoke there is fire.20 Otherwise, why does the
Court recite the details of the defendant's allegations, which are
disputed by the state, and so presumably not considered by the Su-
preme Court?
21
Still another possibility is that the astute prosecutor, who has
other sufficient evidence to convict, withholds the dubious confession,
lest it bring about an automatic reversal without regard to the guilt
of the accused.
22
The cases the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that involun-
tary confessions had been used in obtaining convictions came from
thirteen states. In order of number of cases, they were: Alabama,
four; New York and Texas, three each; Connecticut and Pennsyl-
vania, two each; and Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio,
South Carolina, and Tennessee, one each. The cases in which the state
judgments of conviction were affirmed came from seven states. They
were: California, three; and Arizona, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Oklahoma, and Utah, one each.
Obviously, there is no pattern. The largest number of cases came
from Alabama and New York, with four each, and yet it can hardly
be maintained that New York is following higher standards in crim-
inal law enforcement simply because only three of the New York
convictions in comparison with all four of those from Alabama were
reversed. Nor do the three California affirmances, all by divided courts,
prove that California is following higher standards than Texas with
three reversals. The thirty-one states that have never had a state con-
viction reviewed on the ground that an involuntary confession was
"This rule and its effect is discussed in Ritz, supra note i, beginning at 51.
For another criticism of the rule see Supreme Court Review of State Findings of
Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 328, 339-41 (1962).
This also is the conclusion reached by the writer of the article cited in
note ig supra, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 351.
21E.g., in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), the Court said: "As the district judge
further noted, the record 'carries an unexpressed import of police brutality...'
Reck testified at length to beatings inflicted upon him on each of the four days
he was in police custody before he confessed. His testimony was corroborated. The
police, however, denied beating Reck, and, in view of this conflict in the evidence,
we proceed upon the premise, as did the District Court, that the officers did not
inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held
him in their custody." Id. at 44o.
22See text infra beginning after note ioo.
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admitted into evidence cannot smugly assert claims to higher stand-
ards in law enforcement than exist in the other ni" -c, -n states. Their
time may come soon.
23
The first confession case came from Mississippi in 1936, but since
then the Supreme Court has not reviewed another case. from that state.
Connecticut never had a confession case reviewed by the Supreme
Court until the 196o Term, when two were reviewed and both con-
victions reversed. This hardly demonstrates that standards *of law en-
forcement have declined in Connecticut in comparison with those in
Mississippi, although Judge Clark of the Second Circuit so interprets
the appearance of Connecticut cases on the Supreme Court calendar.
In still another Connecticut case, in the federal courts on habeas
corpus, Judge Clark said:
"It is unfortunate that so many cases of illegally coerced con-
fessions of a like nature are now appearing in this state, so
generally renowned for its fair administration of the law; thus
see Rogers v. Richmond... Culombe v. Connecticut.... It
would seem that legislation setting forth the constitutional
rights of the accused would be helpful as directives to the police
and prosecutors ....24
The conclusion seems inescapable that the pattern of states repre-
sented in confession cases reviewed by the Supreme Court bears no
relationship to the standards of law enforcement being followed in
individual states. "Chance" must be a factor of undeterminable weight.
The state court opinion in the case reviewed by the Supreme Court is
sometimes undistinguishable from the opinion in another case not
reviewed. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut wrote:
"Here again, the question for the court to decide was whether
this conduct induced the defendant to make an involuntary
and hence untrue statement." 25
It was told that "this is not a permissible standard under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."26 Two months later
the Supreme Court of Montana approved the following statement from
an earlier decision of its own:
23Colorado has now been added to the lists of states that have a conviction
reversed in the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that an involuntary confession
was admitted into evidence, See note i supra.
"Reid v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83, 91 n.i (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied (Douglas,
J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
2State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 174, 12o A.ad 409, 412 (1956).
"Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (g6).
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"'The only fair test, if such it can be called.... is this:
Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there
is any fair risk of a false confession? For the object of the rule
is not to exclude a confession of the truth, but to' avoid the
possibility -of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact
innocent.' 2,
In spite of the fact that the Montana test, in light of the Rogers
opinion seems clearly wrong, when review was sought in the U.S.
Supreme Court, Dryman's petition for certiorari was denied.28
Actually, there is no evidence of substance as to the effectiveness of
federal review of state criminal convictions as a deterrent to the use
of the third degree, other than that counsel of despair that every
reversal of a criminal conviction represents a triumph of justice.29 It
cannot be established that federal review of state criminal proceedings
has been helpful in eliminating the third degree, by holding over
state officials the threat of reversals of convictions, or whether the
federal action has been harmful, by promoting more sophisticated
forms of the third degree, falsification of the facts, and particularly
a lowering of the sense of local responsibility for the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
Subconsciously, most people probably feel that the third degree is
used less frequently today than a quarter-century ago. The cause for
the improvements, though, may well be found in a general raising of
ethical and moral standards, rather than in forced improvements
brought about by pressure from the federal judiciary.
When the Supreme Court reverses a criminal conviction on the
ground that it was obtained in a proceeding in which a coerced con-
fession was admitted into evidence, the case is remanded for further
proceedings, which may mean, and usually does mean, a new trial on
the same charge with the "coerced confession" excluded. It is useful to
consider the results of these subsequent proceedings, which, for the
most part, do not find their way into the law reports.
27Dryman v. State, 361 P.2d 959, 961 (Mont. 1961). This opinion was handed
down on May 12, 1961. Rogers v. Richmond was decided March 20, ig6i, so the
opinions in the case were available to the Supreme Court of Montana.
2'Dryman v. Montana, 368 U.S. 990 (1962).
'OAl1 convictions based on coerced confessions will be rectified if all convictions
are reversed, and so it follows as a matter of logic that the more convictions re-
versed the greater the chances are that no convictions based on coerced confessions
will go urireversed. Since the federal judiciary never convicts of state crimes,
but only releases, its activities can never initiate injustice, but only correct injustice,
or at the worst, leave injustice uncorrected.
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I. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REVERSED CASES
Information on subsequent developments in cases reversed by the
U.S. Supreme Court was collected in the following manner. Data for
cases through 1942 had been collected by Boskey and Pickering from
reported cases and newspaper accounts and published in a law review
article in 1946.30 For cases reversed after 1952, Shepards was checked
for subsequently reported cases. A list of cases and a summary of the
information so obtained was sent to the Attorney General of each state
from which a case had come, with a request that the information so
obtained be checked for accuracy, and that supplemental information
be supplied on unreported proceedings. Most Attorney Generals
generously responded to an initial letter, and all except one to a
follow-up letter. While a few of the-Attorney Generals were able to pro-
vide the information requested, most of them either.referred the letter
of inquiry to local officials or advised the writer to correspond with
local officials. Consequently, some direct correspondence was carried
on with local prosecuting officials and defense counsel.
The information so obtained shows the following subsequent de-
velopments in these twenty-two cases reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court: The defendants in exactly half of the cases were again con-
victed of the same or a lesser included offense, while the defendants
in the other half were eventually released in one way or another.
After remand, the defendants in three cases were again tried and
convicted of the same offenses and given the same punishment. 1 The
proceedings in four cases resulted in convictions of the same offenses
1°Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1946).
'Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S.547 (1941). Original conviction was for murder
with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Vernon was again convicted and sen-
tenced to death. The conviction was affirmed in Vernon v. State, 245 Ala. 633, 18 So.
2d 388 (1944). Apparently no further petition for certiorari was filed. In accordance
with the judgment, Vernon was executed.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Original conviction was for murder in the
first degree, with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Watts was again convicted
and sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed in Watts v. Indiana, 229 Ind. So,
95 N.E.2d 570 (1950). Apparently no further petition for certiorari was filed. In
accordance with the judgment Watts was executed.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Original conviction was of murder in the
first degree with a life sentence imposed. On retrial Haley was again convicted and
sentenced to life. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and a
motion to certify the record was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, 151
Ohio St. 8o, 84 N.E.2d 217 (1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949).
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but with lesser punishments imposed.32 Four resulted in convictions of
lesser included offenses, and so with reduced punishments. 3
Ten cases eventually terminated in the judicial release of the de-
fendants while in one case, a rape proceeding, the defendant was
killed during the second trial by the husband of the prosecutrix.34 In
one case the state supreme court on remand directed entry of judg-
GCanty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940). Original conviction was of murder in
first degree with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Canty was again con-
victed of murder in first degree, but with the sentence reduced from death to life
imprisonment. This conviction was reversed because of prejudicial instructions.
Canty v. State, 242 Ala. 589, 7 So. 2d 292 (1942). On retrial Canty was again con-
victed of murder in first degree and sentence fixed at life imprisonment. The con-
viction was affirmed, 244 Ala. ioS, ii So. 2d 844 (943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 746
(1943)-
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 56o (1958). Original conviction was of murder in
first degree with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Payne was again convicted
of murder in first degree and sentenced to death. The conviction was reversed in
a four-to-three decision on the ground that a re-enactment of the crime "amounted
to but a part of his coerced confession, and was also coerced and unlawfully ob-
tained." Payne v. Arkansas, 231 Ark. 727, 332 SAW.2d 233, 235 (196o). Another
trial resulted in a conviction of first degree murder and a life sentence, which con-
viction was not appealed.
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941). Original conviction was of rape with the
death sentence imposed. On retrial Lomax was again convicted of rape, but with
the sentence reduced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed, Lomax
v. Texas, 146 Tex. Crim. 531, 176 S.W.2d 752 (1944). [This was the third trial in the
Texas courts, the original conviction having been reversed because the trial judge
had not submitted to the jury the question of whether Lomax's confession was
voluntary. Lomax v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 1o8, 124 S.W.2d 126 (1939)]-
3Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (196-). Original conviction of murder in
first degree and death sentence imposed. On remand Rogers pleaded guilty to
murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonmnt.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (19i1). Original conviction of murder
in first degree and death sentence imposed. On remand Culombe pleaded guilty
to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Original conviction of murder and
death sentence imposed. On remand, defendant pleaded nolo contendre to a
charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to 7 1/2 years imprisonment with credit
for the 2 1/2 years already served. Other defendants were sentenced to terms of
2 1/2 to 3 years, with similar credit for time served.
Spano v. New York, 36o U.S. 315 (1959). Original conviction of murder in
first degree and death sentence imposed. During the course of a retrial Spano
pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, and was sentenced to io-2o years
imprisonment.
"White v. Texas, 3og U.S. 631. on petition to rehear, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). The
original conviction of rape, in which the death sentence had been imposed, was
reversed by a state court. White v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 210, 117 S.W.2d 450 (i938).
On retrial there was another conviction of rape and the death sentence again im-
posed. This conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. While a jury
was being impaneled for a third trial, the defendant was killed in open court by
the husband of the prosecutrix. The husband was later acquitted.
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ment for the defendant. 35 The state nol-prossed further prosecutions
in four cases. 36 In one case one defendant was 1;3, 1 in a mental
institution during the course of the proceedings ano the trial judge
directed a verdict of acquittal as to the other defendants in what
was the fifth trial of the case.37 Two cases with the confessions ex-
cluded, resulted in jury acquittals. 38 Two cases resulted again in jury
convictions, but the holdings of the state appellate courts in setting
aside the convictions eventually required nol-prossing the convic-
tions.39
'Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). See text infra after note 68
3Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). See text infra after note 43.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US. 199 (1961). Original conviction was of
robbery, with sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Incident to the nol-prossing of
the case, the Veterans Administration took custody of Blackburn-and placed him
in a veterans hospital.
Reck v. Pate, 367 US. 433 (ig6i). Original conviction in 1936 was of murder
with a life sentence imposed. The other parties also convicted of the crime are
still in the penitentiary and refuse to testify against Reck. Without the confession
and without this testimony the state found it necessary to ask for the entry of a
nolle prosequi.
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)- Original conviction was of murder without
malice with a 3 year sentence imposed. Ward was first indicted at September Term
1939. The case was dismissed on October 22, 1942. The defendant very probably had
been confined all or a large part of three years.
T Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227 (ig4o). The four defendants had originally
been convicted of murder and the death sentence imposed in 1933. A multiplicity
of the state court proceedings followed, culminating in the reversal by the US. Su-
preme Court on February 12, 194o. Meanwhile, Chambers had been transferred to
the state hospital for the insane. The other three defendants were again tried, after
various legal proceedings in the Florida courts. On March 9, 1942, the trial judge
directed entry of judgments of acquittal.
wMalinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Original conviction of murder in
first degree with death sentence imposed. On retrial in June 1946 the jury returned
a verdict of acquittal.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), 327 U.S. 274 (1946). Ashcraft was
twice convicted of murder and twice sentenced to life imprisonment. Both con-
victions were reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that involuntary
confessions had been admitted into evidence. A third trial resulted in a jury verdict
of not guilty, both as to Ashcraft and his co-defendent, Ware.
ILeyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). An original conviction of murder in the
first degree with the death sentence imposed was reversed by the Court of Appeals
of New York, People v. Leyra, 3o2 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951)- On retrial Leyra
was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The conviction
was affirmed by a four-to-two decision. People v. Leyra, 3o4 N.Y. 468, io8 N.E.2d
673 (1952), cert. denied (Black. J., and Douglas, J., dissenting), 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
This conviction was reversed in the federal habeas corpus proceedings that followed.
347 U.S. 556 (1954). On his third trial, Leyra was again found guilty and sentenced
to death, but this conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a four-to-two
decision. People v. Leyra, 1 N.Y.2d 199, 134 N.E.2d 475 (1956). As a result of this
decision the indictment was dismissed.
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949). See text infra after note 56.
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In the eleven cases in which convictions were again obtained in new
trials after Supreme Court reversal, the principal tangible benefit to
the defendants resulted from "delay." There was delay. in the execu-
tion of the death sentence on the two defendants again convicted of the
same crime and sentenced to death. Delay, operating somewhat dif-
ferently, was also of significance in the eight cases in which the de-
fendants were again convicted of the same offenses, with lesser pun-
ishments imposed, or convicted of lesser included offenses, carrying
lesser punishments. The results in these cases confirmed the guilt of
the defendants. Delay in bringing the cases to a final disposition was
probably the most important factor that operated to secure the reduc-
tions in punishment. The Supreme Court reversal was of no apparent
benefit to the one defendant who was again found guilty of the same
crime and again sentenced to life imprisonment.
In several of the cases in which the defendants were not again con-
victed the benefits to the defendants involved are somewhat tangential
or speculative. One defendant was killed before he could be tried
again. 40 Another defendant was transferred to a mental institution
and while he remains there cannot be tried again.41 A third defen-
dant's relatively short sentence militated against renewed prosecu-
tion.42 One defendant, for quite extraordinary reasons, has not been
able to obtain the benefits of the reversal; this is the defendant in
Fikes v. Alabama.
43
Fikes was charged with one rape and six burglaries. He confessed
commission of all the crimes. He was tried for rape, convicted, and
sentenced to 99 years imprisonment. He was then tried on another
charge, for burglary with intent to commit rape, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death. This latter conviction was reversed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court on the ground that his confession was involuntary. The
state did not prosecute again, since without the confession there was
not sufficient other evidence to sustain a conviction. The earlier con-
viction for rape was based, in part at least, on a similar "involuntary
confession," and so this conviction can presumably be set aside when-
ever the question is properly raised in court. However, there is evi-
dence other than the confession that might support another convic-
tion of rape, the evidence being the testimony of the victim who iden-
tified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The dilemma
OWhite-v. Texas, nose 34 supra.
4tBlackbure v. Alabama, note 36 supra.
"Ward v. Texas, note 36 spura.
035t U.S. 191 (1957). Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 5-46 (1961).
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posed for the defendant is that under Alabama law a retrial is on the
whole charge and a second conviction with the death sentence imposed
would not violate Alabama principles of double jeopardy. So far the
defendant has not chosen to run this risk and remains confined in the
penitentiary under an "unconstitutional" criminal judgment. Here
again, time and delay may eventually operate to the benefit of the
defendant. It is possible the victir will die so as to diminish the force
of the other evidence available for another trial. Another distinct
possibility is that the Supreme Court will extend the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment -to the states, which clause as interpreted
by the Court bars the imposition of greater punishment upon a second
conviction.
44
The subsequent developments in three cases reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court on June 27, 1949, are of particular interest because
they encompassed a large range of possibilities. These three convictions,
each of which carried the death penalty, came from different parts
of the country: Watts v. Indiana,45 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 46 and
Harris v. South Carolina.47
The reversals in all three were by a Court whose members were so
badly divided in their reasons that there were no majority opinions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the judgments of the Court,
spoke only for himself and Justices Murphy and Rutledge.4 8 He said
the confessions were inadmissible, aside from any question of their
reliability or untruthfulness, because obtained by proceedings that
"offend the procedural standards of due process." 49 Mr. Justice Black
thought all three confessions had been obtained by "inherently coer-
cive" proceedings within the meaning of prior decisions.50 Mr. Justice
Douglas would have reversed because the confessions were obtained
while the defendants were held by the police in illegal detention.51
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton would have af-
firmed all three convictions on the record in the state courts.52 Mr.
Justice Jackson, who was concerned primarily with the reliability of
the confessions, thought the Watts conviction from Indiana should
be reversed on the basis of "the State's admissions as 'to treatment
"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)-
5338 U.S. 49 (1949).
"338 U.S. 62 (1949).
1338 U.S. 68 (1949).
"338 U.S. at 49, 63, 68.
19Id. at 54.
0Id. at 55, 66, 71.
'1 Id. at 56, 66, 71.
"Id. at 55, 66, 71.
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of Watts,"53 while the convictions from Pennsylvania and South
Carolina should be affirmed.
In light of subsequent developments in the three cases, these com-
ments can be made: While Watts obtained the largest number of votes
for reversal, six in all, he, of all three, was the defendant most cer-
tainly guilty. While Harris obtained fewer votes for a reversal, only
five, of the three he was the one most likely innocent of the crime for
which he had been convicted. On the basis of the record in the state
courts, there is little doubt but that Turner, whose conviction was
reversed by five votes, was actually guilty and escaped final conviction
because of the Supreme Court rule relating to confessions.
For those who criticize any Supreme Court supervision of state
criminal proceedings, the Turner case provides strong support. For
those who commend such Supreme Court supervision, the Harris
case provides support. For those who believe the rules established by
the Supreme Court interfere with state admistration of criminal
justice, the Watts case provides support. But when a comparison is
made of Watts and Turner, some doubts must be expressed as to
whether legal technicalities are not interfering with the equal ad-
ministration of state criminal justice. And when a comparison is
made of Watts and Harris, all should take pause. The comparison
suggests that the states are not sufficiently careful in protecting the
innocent from conviction, but it also suggests that the federal judicial
supervision of state criminal proceedings is more attuned to dealing
with unconstitutional convictions of the guilty than with barring
constitutional convictions of the innocent.
Watts v. Indiana involved murder in connection with an attempted
criminal assault. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death
were originally affirmed by a unanimous state supreme court.54 On
remand, in a trial with the confession excluded, Watts was again
convicted of the same crime and sentenced to death. This second con-
viction was affirmed by a unanimous court. 5 Watts was executed.5 6
Turner v. Pennsylvania involved a brutal double murder commit-
ted in 1945 during perpetration of a robbery. Turner, Johnson, and
Lofton were charged with the crime. Turner and Johnson pleaded not
guilty, but they were convicted and death sentences imposed. Lofton,
the look-out, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
53Id. at 57, 60.
r'Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846 (1948).
nWatts v. State, 229 Ind. 8o, 95 N.E.2d 570 (195o).
O'Letter from Patrick D. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, August
31, 1961.
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,The original 1946 conviction of Turner was affirmed by a unan-
imous Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.57 After the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed this conviction,58 a series of four more trials followed, in
each of which Turner was convicted of murder in the fiLbt degree.
The jury imposed the death penalty in the first four of Turner's
five convictions and life imprisonment in the fifth. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in a unarimous decision reversed the second
convictionG9 and by a four-to-two vote reversed the third conviction.60
The fourth conviction was set aside by the trial court and the fifth
conviction reversed unanimously by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, 61 but with two judges dissenting from the majority's direction
that the charge should be nol-prossed unless additional evidence
could be presented at another trial. Lofton testified against Turner in
his second and third trials, but refused to do so in the fourth and fifth
trials. For refusing to testify, Lofton was found guilty of contempt by
the trial court, but this conviction was reversed on appeal.6 2 In ac-
cordance with the direction of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the state entered a nolle prosequi on the charge against Turner and
he was released 3
Johnson was also convicted of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced to death. This conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in a four-to-one decision, 64 but reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion on the authority of the
Turner decision. 6 In a second trial, with Lofton testifying against him,
Johnson was again convicted of murder in the first degree, but the
jury reduced the punishment to life imprisonment.66
So in end result, after this series of trials: Lofton, who pleaded
guilty remained in confinement. Johnson, who had been twice tried
and convicted, remained in confinement. Turner, who was able to
drag the proceedings through five trials, all of which resulted in con-
victions, four in the imposition of the death sentence,-won final
judicial release. Justice Musmanno found in this result a rewarding
5'Commonwealth v. Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A.2d 61 (1948).
'8338 U.S. 62 (1949).
WCommonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403, 8o A.2d 7o8 (1951).
WCommonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952).
"Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 13 A.2d 187 (1957).
"'Commonwealth v. Lofton, 389 Pa. 273, 133 A.2d 203 (1957).
"Letter from Arlen Specter, Assistant Attorney General, Philadelphia, Pa.,
October 27, 1961.
"Commonwealth v. Johnson,.365 Pa. 303, 74 A.2d 144 (g5o).
'Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 US. 881 (195o).
"Letter, supra note 41.
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end for "the search for the priceless jewel of truth,"67 Justice Bell
on the other hand, made this comment: "Lofton, io years after plead-
ing guilty to these murders and after all these years in jail, now swears
that he and Turner and Johnson never committed or had anything to
do with these murders. How gullible can we be?"68
Harris v. South Carolina involved the brutal murder of a country
storekeeper and his wife. The last words of the dying man were re-
portedly, "A big negro shot me and robbed me."6 9 Harris, although of
slight build, was convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina affirmed by a three-to-two vote.70 Both the
trial court and the South Carolina Supreme Court majority recog-
nized that the conviction could not be sustained without the use of
the defendant's confession. The two dissenting judges would have re-
versed because they thought the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the undisputed facts was that the confession had not been freely
and voluntarily made. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an order under date of Sep-
tember 2o, 1949, directing that judgment should be entered for the
defendant, who was then released.
7 1
Before himself confessing, Harris had accused another person of
the crime, but no prosecution was ever instituted against the person
so accused. Still another person later confessed to a series of crimes,
including the murders in the Harris case, and on his plea of guilty,
he was convicted of these murders. Since the person who ultimately
confessed did so to a number of crimes, the risk involved in confessing
to the murders in the Harris case was less than total. This and other
aspects of the case make it impossible to draw the certain conclusion
from subsequent developments that the Harris case involved the con-
viction of an innocent man for a crime committed by someone else.
It can be said with assurance, though, that the Harris case involved
a defendant whom the state had not proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that subsequent developments in this case, more than
those in any other, indicate that the accused was innocent.
These three cases, when compared and considered in relation to
others, reveal several defects in the present administration of criminal
justice: (1) Either guilty persons are being released by application
,'133 A.2d at 202.
1Id. n.,3 at 202.
"0338 U.S. at 69.
"State v. Harris, 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682 (1948).
'Letter from Hon. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General'of South Carolina,
September 12, 1961.
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of the present rules regarding confessions, or the administration of
criminal justice is so defective that innocent persons are being re-
peatedly convicted. (2) Long-delayed judicial reversals of convictions
are interfering with the orderly administration of the executive func-
tion of parole and pardon. (3) As a result of these two defects, the
criminal law is being applied unevenly to participants in the same
crime, with the result that the more guilty may go unpunished while
the less guilty suffer punishment. (4) The rights of innocent persons,
other than the person who is immediately accused, are perhaps not
being sufficiently considered and safeguarded.
Turner was convicted five times. Three different New York
juries found Leyra guilty of first degree murder and as a result he
was sentenced to death three times.7 2 Eventually, though, the New
York Court of Appeals in a four-to-two decision held -that the con-
viction, without the confession, was not supported by the evidence and
so the conviction was quashed and the defendant released.
In view of the repeated convictions by juries, initial affirmances
by respected state appellate courts, and ultimate quashing of the
convictions by divided courts, it seems impossible to treat the de-
fendants in the Turner and Leyra cases as having been judicially de-
clared to be "innocent" of the crimes with which they were charged.
But if the final dismissals can be so treated, then the present admin-
istration of criminal justice is extremely defective. If five juries in
Pennsylvania and three juries in New York can go so wrong as to
convict innocent men repeatedly; if the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania and the Court of Appeals of New York can go so wrong as to af-
firm convictions of innocent men; and if a large minority of the
members of the Supreme Court of the United States can go so wrong
as to vote to affirm the convictions of innocent men, the administra-
tion of criminal justice is indeed in a sad state.
The conscience rests easier on the assumption that Turner and
Leyra were guilty and escaped final conviction because of legal tech-
nicalities, rather than that these men were truly innocent and so the
victims of massive and continued injustice.
Turner v. Pennsylvania involved a crime in which three accom-
plices were convicted. All or none were guilty. From the legal stand-
point all participants in a crime, whether as perpetrator, aider and
abettor, or accessory before the fact, are equally guilty, but some
gradations in guilt are achieved through variations in the punish-
1Turner v. Pennsylvania, supra text after note 56; Leyra v. Denno, note 39
supra.
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ment imposed. Using such gradations in punishment as a basis for
determining relative guilt, the Turner case presents this situation:
Lofton, the look-out, was the least guilty by definition and because he
aided the state. He was never sentenced to death, but only to life im-
prisonment. Johnson was sentenced to death once, but on a second
trial the punishment was reduced to life imprisonment, and so he
must be considered the next most guilty. Turner was sentenced to
death four times and to life once, and so must be considered the most
guilty of the three. Yet in ultimate result it was Turner who obtained
final judicial release while Johnson and Lofton were left in confine-
ment.
Similarly, in Reck v. Pate73 one participant in the crime won final
release, since his accomplices refused to testify against him in another
trial,74 while the accomplices remain in prison.
The developments in another case, although not yet reviewed
by the Supreme Court, demonstrate the current vagaries that result
from long-delayed federal judicial review of state criminal proceed-
ings, particularly in the arbitrary discriminations that may result. In
1932, in New York three men confessed to murder committed during
armed robbery. All three were convicted of murder in the first de-
gee and sentenced to life imprisonment. There they remained for
twenty-three years. Then in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that Caminito's confession was involuntary.75 In 1956,
the Court of Appeals of New York, following this federal lead, made
a similar ruling as regarded Bonino's confession,76 and he too was
released. For technical reasons, however, it was not until 1962 that
the third person, Noia, was able to obtain a similar ruling on his con-
fession, again from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
77
He has not yet obtained release, however, since the U.S. Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in the case. 78 Was justice served when
Turner was released and Lofton and Johnson held in confinement?
Was justice served when Reck was released and his accomplices held
in confinement? Is it just to hold Noia in prison seven and more years
longer than Caminito?
"See note 36 supra.
7'Letter from Hon. Daniel P. Ward., State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,
October 25, 1961.
nUnited States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing,
127 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
7 'People v. Bonino, i N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51 (1956).
TUnited States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, Soo F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Fay v. Noia, 369 U.S. 869 (1962).
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Legal rules, or technicalities, can be found that will serve to ex-
plain these results. 79 They do not serve to justify ,c results either to
the prisoners held in confinement or to a public ilite, .sted in the fair
and equal administration of criminal justice. This iz not to argue that
criminals should not be treated on an individual basis, or that it is
not proper to keep one of several participants in a crime in confine-
ment while others are released. However, it is to argue that the state
parole authorities are the agencies of government charged by law
with the responsibility for making such distinctions, and that ap-
pellate judges are not so charged. Where innocent men are held in
confinement, every effort should be made to secure thir immediate re-
lease. But where guilty men are held in confinement, it is the executive
branch of government that is charged by law and is in the best po-
sition to determine which prisoners have been rehabilitated and should
be released and which ones should be held in confinement until their
sentences are served.
Another aspect of the long-delayed judicial reversal is that it
encourages a tongue-in-cheek approach to the serious matter of crim-
inal law. The U.S. Supreme Court in ig6i in Reck v. Pate reversed a
1936 murder conviction and remanded the case to allow "the State
a reasonable time in which to retry the petitioner."8 0 Is such a remand
to be taken seriously? What factors should the prosecuting officials
consider in determining whether to retry the petitioner?
It is doubtful if a state can fairly prosecute for a crime committed
a quarter of a century ago. But even if it can, is there any sense to a
system that involves prosecutions of defendants twenty-five years after
they have been placed in confinement, and who have been amenable
to prosecution all that time? While the sixth amendment does not ap-
ply to the states, the principle of a "speedy" trial does have merit in
any sound system of criminal law administration. Such remands
after twenty-five years are hardly consistent with the principle.
If the prisoner is truly innocent in such a case, there has been a
grave miscarriage of justice that is hardly remedied by simple release
following twenty-five years of confinement. If the prosecuting authori-
ties consider the prisoner to be guilty, in deciding whether to prose-
cute again, the state must consider all the factors that would be rele-
vant to a determination of whether the prisoner should be released on
parole. Twenty-five years of confinement cannot be ignored. The judi-
ciary itself, when it orders such long-delayed releases, acts more in
9E.g., see note on the Second Circuit decision in 48 Va. L. Rev. 761 (1962).
"567 U.S. 433, 444 (190).
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the executive capacity of a thinly disguised super-board of paroles
and pardons than in a judicial capacity.
In three of the cases reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the de-
fendants finally won acquittals. In Chambers v. Florida,sl the defen-
dant had originally been convicted in 1933. After a multiplicity of
legal proceedings, directed verdicts of acquittal in favor of the defen-
dants were entered in 1942, after the defendant whose name the case
bears had been transferred to a mental institution. Nine years is a long
time. Ashcraft was twice convicted of murder, which convictions were
twice affirmed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and twice reversed
by the United States Supreme Court;8 2 only thereafter did Ashcraft
win a jury acquittal. Malinski's original conviction had been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals of New York in a four-to-three decision, which
conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in a five-to-four
decision.s3 Again it can only be said, that if these defendants were
innocent, the judicial system came perilously close to working grave
injustices. One can be happier with the present judicial system if one
assumes that these defendants were guilty.
This leaves the Harris case, in which another man was eventually
convicted of the crime for which Harris had been convicted and
sentenced to death. Did the Supreme Court in this case save an in-
nocent man from death? If it did, it is arguable that this one case
alone would justify Supreme Court review of state criminal proceed-
ings. However, the matter is not so simple. Suppose that Harris was
in fact guilty, then the very reversal of his confession resulted in the
conviction of an innocent man, whose conviction remains unreversed.
How can it be known with certainty that the guilty person was the
second man, who pleaded guilty to a series of crimes, and not Harris,
who confessed, albeit involuntarily, to the crime?
The truth of the matter is that the more certain the guilt of the
person convicted by use of an involuntary confession, the less harm
can result from overturning the conviction. The release of the guilty
though becomes a luxury that can be ill-afforded if it should result in
the conviction of the innocent. If the law enforcement officials should
" See note 37 supra. ,
BThe case in the state courts is not reported. The first Supreme Court re-
versal was by a six-to-three vote, with Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Roberts
dissenting. 322 U.S. 143 (1944). The second reversal was by a unanimous court, but
with Frankfurter joining on the basis of the decision in the first case and Jackson
not participating. 327 US. 274 (1946).
83Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), reversing 292 N.Y. 36o, 55 N.E.2d
353 (1944).
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assume that the judicial overturning of a conviction establishes the in-
nocence of the person involved, they would be duty-bound to seek for
another person as the perpetrator. It is possible, with the prime suspect
judicially removed from furthei consideration, that the person so found
will be innocent.
Suppose the second person accused in the Harris case had denied
guilt, would the Harris "involuntary confession" have been admissible
in evidence to prove Harris's guilt and so by necessary implication
the innocence of the second defendant? Surely in this situation the
Rogers v. Richmond rule that the admissibility into evidence of the
confession must be determined "with complete disregard of whether
or not [Harris] in fact spoke the truth"8 4 does not apply.
Here a question may be asked that bears on larger considerations
of ethics and morality: "May coercion be used' to extort a confession
from a guilty person in order to save an innocent person from con-
viction?" This could be the situation if the confession led to other
evidence that demonstrated. the truth of the confession. The question,
even left unanswered, may serve to highlight a fundamental principle
involved in the administration of the criminal law: The most certain
way to protect the innocent is to find and convict the guilty.
II. A SuRvEy oF CURRENT STATE CONFESSIoN'CAsES
Evidence is not available to show the frequency with which the
question of the voluntariness of a confession is raised in trial courts,
or the number of confessions ruled involuntary as a matter of law by
the trial judges. The frequency with which the question is raised in
the state appellate courts shows that the matter is being considered
in a large number of criminal trials.
In 1946, Professor McCormick reported the results of a survey he
had made of the cases reported in the digest during the twenty-year
period that had then elapsed since 1926.85 He reported:
"The digests for the twenty-year period 1926-1945 reveal 94
appeals in which the appellant claimed force or threats in se-
curing a confession. The number of cases by years varies from i
to 8. There was i in 1927, and there were 8 in each of the years
193o and 1939, and surprisingly there were likewise 8 in the first
half year of 1945. The number of these cases in which a reversal
"s65 U-S. at 544-
"McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Con-
fessions, 24 Texas L. Rev. 239 (1946).
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is granted varies from 1 to 4 annually and recent years have
seen no lessening of reversals."8
In 1959, Professor Maguire reviewed the status of state law relating
to involuntary confessions, particularly as it was being affected by
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.8 7 More recently, Donald
G. Targan has made a survey of the appellate court cases during the
nine-year period from 1952 to 196o.88 By Shepardizing the twenty-
nine confession cases reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Targan
found ninety-two state cases in which the defendants alleged that their
confessions had been obtained by physical or psychological coercion.8 9
The present writer has scanned the advance sheets of all series of
the National Reporter System for somewhat more than a year looking
for confession cases relevant to this inquiry and has found more than
eighty such cases.90
It is evident from the present survey that the number of cases in
the state appellate court has greatly increased since Professor Mc-
Cormick reported on the subject in 1946. It also seems clear that Mr.
Targan's figure of ninety-two cases for a nine-year period considerably
understates the actual number of cases, since his survey did not include
any cases in which the state court did not cite a U.S. Supreme Court
decision, there being a a considerable number of such cases. However,
it is probable that Mr. Targan's figure does include most of the
cases in which a truly serious question was presented as to whether
the confession was involuntary. The increase in number of confes-
sion cases has not been paralleled by any similar increase in the
number of reversals of convictions on the ground that involuntary
confessions were used. Instead, the number of reversals each year dur-
ing the past quarter century appears to have been fairly constant.
In the large majority of confession cases presented to state appel-
late courts in 1961-62, the courts appear to have had little doubt but
"Id. at 244. In his survey, Professor McCormick used "Criminal Law, Key no.
522 (Confessions, Voluntary Character, Threats and Fear)."
Ot Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 107-66 (1959), an earlier version of which had
been published as Maguire, 'Involuntary Confessions,' 31 Tul. L. Rev. 125 (1956).
OComment, Justice Black-Inherent Coercion: An Analytical Study of the
Standard for Determining the Voluntariness of a Confession, io Am. U.L. Rev.
53 (1961).
Oid. at 54.
"While no particular claim to complete coverage is made, it is believed that
substantially all reported cases for 1961 and early 1962 were found, so that the
cases covered give a reasonably complete picture of current litigation involving
confessions.
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that the confessions were voluntary. 91 In a substantial number of cases
the defendant's contention of involuntariness of F confession is
based on a claim that it was obtained after an illegal ,irest, ur during
a period of illegal detention as by denial of counsel or failtue to take
before an examining magistrate.9 2 Occasionally, of course, the mem-
1 fHargett v. State, 357 S.W.2d 533 (Ark. 1962); People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288,
14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865 (1961); People v. Carter, 56 Cal. 2d 549, 15 Cal. Rptr.
645, 364 P.2d 477 (1961); People.v. Fitzgerald, 56 Cal. 2d 855, 17 Cal. Rptr. 129,
366 P.2d 481 (ig6i); People v. Kaminsky, 22 Cal. Rptr. 191 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. '96'); Shuler v. State, 132 So. 2d 7
(Fla. ig6i); Ebert v. State, 140 So. 2d 63 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1962); People v.
Sims, 21 Ill. 2d 425, 173 N.E.2d 494 (1961); People v. Seno, 23 Ill. 2d 2o6, 177
N.E.2d 843 (1961);
People v. Mosley, 23 Ill. 2d 211, 177 N.E.2d 851 ('96i); People v. Jackson, 23
Ill. 2d 274, 178 N.E.2d 299 ('96i); People v. Carter, 182 N.E.2d, 197 (Ill. 1962);
People v. Freeman, 182 N.E.2d 677 (IIl. 1962); State v. Jones, 1.13 N.W.2d 303
(Iowa 1962);
Andrews v. Hand, 372 P.2d 559 (Kans. 1962); State v. Collins, 242 La. 704,
138 So. 2d 546 (1962); State v. Scott, 141 So. 2d 389 (La. 1962); State v. Bueche, 142
So. 2d 381 (La. 1962); Doyon v. State, 181 A.2d 586 (Me. 1962);
Parker v. State, 225 Md. 288, 17o A.2d 21o (i96i); Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480,
174 A.2d 163 (1961), cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 369 U.S. 813 (1962);
Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 179 A.2d 421 (1962); Jones v. State, 182 A.2d 784 (Md.
1962); Commonwealth v. Pina, 174 N.E.2d 370 (Mash. 1961);
State v. Arradondo, 26o Minn. 512, 11o N.W.2d 469 (1g6i); Richardson v.
State, 133 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1961); State v. Ray, 354 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1962); Dryman
v. State, 361 P.2d 959 (Mont. 1961); State v. Nelson, 362 P.2d 224 (Mont. i96i);
Bloeth v. New York, 9 N.Y.2d 211, 213 N.Y.S.2d 51, 173 N.E.2d 782 (1961), on
motion to amend remittur, 9 N.Y.2d 823, 215 N.Y.S.2d 769, 175 N.E.2d 347 (1961),
cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Outing, 255
N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847 (1961); Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, i6g A.2d
78o (1961); State v. Young, 238 S.C. 115, 119 S.E.2d 504 (1961), cert. denied (Doug-
las, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Worthy, 123 S.E.2d 835 (S.C. 1962);
Link v. State, 355 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); Porter v. State, 357 S.W.2d
401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); State v. Holman, 58 Wash. 2d 754, 364 P.2d 921 (1961).
Stories of police brutality are sometimes told, which, if true, leave little doubt
of the involuntary character of the confession, but usually such stories are found
to be untrue.
People v. Nischt, 23 Ill. 2d 284, 178 N.E.2d 378 (1961).; Johnson v. State,
336 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. i96o), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 927 (196o); Smith
v. State, 35o Tex. Crim. App. 344 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
In Johnson v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Tex. 1961), the federal district judge
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding had this to say of the petitioner's story,
"His tale of beatings, abuse, etc. struck this court as pure fabrication. Arranged
against petitioner's incredible, unsupported story of coercion is a coherent, plaus-
ible narration of the events...." Id. at 263. The district judge's denial of the
petition for habeas corpus was affirmed in 296 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. i96i), cert. denied
(Douglas, J., dissenting), 369 U.S. 842 (1962).
"2People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal. 2d 71, 14 Cal. Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13 (1961); People
v. Garner, 15 Cal. Rptr. 620, 364 P.2d 452 (x961); Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d
329 (Fla. ig6i), cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 1005 (1962); Daw-
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bers of the courts have been divided as to whether a particular con-
fession was voluntary or involuntary.93
Most of the reversals of convictions in the state courts are made on
the basis that some state rule relating to the admissibility of confessions
has been violated.94 Less frequently, in reversing, the state courts place
the decision on the ground that the confession was obtained in viola-
tion of standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.95
son v. State, 139 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1962); Young v. State, 140 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1962);
State v. Evans, 372 P.2d 365 (Hawaii 1962); Parker v. Mississippi, 141 So. 2d
546 (Miss. 1962); People v. Lane, io N.Y.2d 347, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d
347 (1961); People v. Everett, io N.Y.2d 500, 225 N.Y.S.2d 193, 18o N.E.2d 556
(1962); People v. Doyle, 13 App. Div. 2d 6o 5 , 212 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3 d Dep't 1961);
State v. Scarberry, 114 Ohio App. 85, i8o N.E.2d 631 (Ct. App., Scioto County,
Ohio 1961); In re Dare, 370 P.2d 846 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962); Lopez v. State, 352
S.W.2d io6 (Tex. Crim App. 1961); Collins v. State, 352 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1962); Fernandez v. State, 353 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962);
Marrufo v. State, 357 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); State v. Self, 366 P.2d
193 (Wash. 1961).
'People v. Roth, ii N.Y.2d 8o, 226 N.Y.S.2d 421, 181 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (con-
viction reversed because of admission of psychiatrist's report into evidence, but
three of seven judges would also have reversed on ground that defendant's
confession was involuntary); State v. Haynes, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961)
(conviction affirmed by a 5-to-4 decision, four judges dissenting on the ground that
the confession was involuntary); People v. Roberts, 364 Mich. 6o, 1o N.W.2d 718
(1961) (the trial court's denial of a motion to quash was affirmed by an equally
divided court, four judges taking the view that the proceedings should be quashed
because of a failure to take the defendant, a juvenile, before a juvenile court as
required by statute); Commonwealth v. Graham, 182 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1962) (convic-
tion affirmed, one judge dissenting).
"People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231 (1960) (im-
plied threat that release from custody of wife of accused was dependent upon
accused confessing); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 15 Cal. Rept. 909, 364
P. 2d 845 (s96i) (officers told defendant that unless they got what they wanted,
they would write "liar" on his statement and then he could expect no leniency from
the court); People v. Rand, 21 Cal. Rptr. 89 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (threat to
take wife to jail if accused did not confess); People v. Jackson, 23 111- 2d 263, 178
N.E.2d 3to (1961) (confession obtained during preliminary hearing); State v. Cross,
357 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1962) (trial court failed to instruct that jury must find con-
fession to be true before they could consider it as evidence of guilt); State v.
Tassiello, 75 N.J. Super. 1, 182 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1962) (trial judge who admitted
confession of one defendant and excluded that of another obtained under similar
circumstances must have been mistaken as to the applicable law); People v. Howard,
15 App. Div. 2d 863, 224 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1962) (police questioned defendant
after his arraignment); Odis v. State, 345 S.V.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (trial
judge refused on request by the jury to define duress required to make a confes-
sion involuntary).
vIllinois has held that a confession obtained after the defendant had been
detained in confinement for eight days is involuntary as a matter of law. People v.
Price, 24 Ill. 2d 46, 179 N.E.2d 685 (1962). Arkansas has ruled that fifty-two hours
of continuous questioning violates the "inherently coercive" Ashcraft rule. Binns v.
State, 344 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1961).
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Under the rules developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
makes ultimate findings of fact that a confession was or was not in-
voluntary, with the result that if ruled involuntary, the confession is
excluded from further proceedings in the state court. Professor Ma-
guire has commented that "the very minimum effect" of this pro-
cedure is "to remove this issue from state hands for decision in Wash-
ington. 96 State courts, on the other hand, are reversing and ordering
new trials at which time further consideration may be given by the
trial court to the character of the confession. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas in Binns v. State97 said that fifty-two hours of continuous
questioning was inherently coercive as a matter of law, but neverthe-
less, while reversing the conviction, left the way open for the trial court
to determine whether such extended questioning had in fact taken
place.9 8 The same procedure is being followed in Illinois99 and New
Jersey.10°
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, the
well-advised prosecutor with substantial evidence of guilt, aside from
the confession, will not introduce the confession into evidence. This
may lead the accused himself to try to get the "coerced confession"
into evidence or take advantage of it in some other way so as to secure
the benefits of an automatic reversal. In the North Carolina case of
State v. Gaskill'0 ' the defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced
to life imprisonment. In his cross-examination of a police officer,
the attorney for the defendant undertook to bring out that the state
had obtained a confession, a tape recording of which was available
and that it had been obtained by duress. The Supreme Court of North
"Maguire, supra note 87, at 124.
1344 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1961).
lAwne point had not been argued by counsel for the defendant, which led one
concurring judge to doubt whether the continuous questioning had in fact occurred,
and so he thought the defendant was getting a "windfall reversal." One judge dis-
sented, taking the view that the record did not show that this continuous question-
ing had taken place.
The procedure of the Binns case was followed in Kasinger v. State, 354 S.W.2d
718 (Ark. 1962).
"ePeople v. Nemke, 23 IIl. 2d 591, 179 N.E.2d 825 (1962).
nOState v. Fauntleroy, 36 N.J. 762, 177 A.sd 762 (x962).
10256 N.C. 652, 124 S.E.2d 873 (1962). In Doyon v. State, x8i A.sd 586 (Me.
1962), a confession was admitted into evidence, but a tape recording of the inter-
rogation was excluded on motion of the defendant. In a petition for writ of error
coram nobis the defendant based his claim almost entirely on the contents of
the tape recording. In denying the petition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
said that coram nobis was not a device by which the petitioner could "reconsider
his earlier decisions as to what evidence to offer on his own behalf and what
evidence to seek to exclude from consideration by the jury." Id. at 587.
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Carolina ruled against any argument based on the confession, saying,
"A defendant cannot invalidate a trial by voluntarily introducing
evidence which he might have excluded if that evidence had been
offered by the State."' 02 Similarly, Missouri has refused to permit a
collateral attack, by way of habeas corpus, on a judgment of con-
viction following a plea of guilty, where the indictment by the grand
jury was based on a "coerced confession."' 03 A trial court in New York
has ruled that even if a confession was coerced, its legal vitality dis-
appears as an effective issue after the defendant, on the advice of
counsel, pleads guilty. 10
4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in United
States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond'0 5 that a state prisoner cannot claim a
denial of due process in his conviction, when his counsel as a matter
of strategy permitted introduction of an "involuntary" confession into
evidence without objection. Speaking for the majority, Chief Judge
Lumbard said, "We see no reason to require a state to try a criminal
case on the theory that the state may not rely on concessions of
counsel and the testimony of the defendant himself."' 06 Circuit Judge
Waterman, dissenting from a denial of a petition for rehearing, indi-
cated that he was puzzled as to why defense counsel, a Public De-
fender, did not object to the introduction of the confessions "if only
to save for appellate review the obvious constitutional questions."' 07
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was recently extended by
the Supreme Court of California to involuntary confessions. The court
did so in People v. Ditson'0 8 without upsetting death-$entence con-
victions of a particularly brutal gangland murder. The trial court had
excluded a confession as being involuntary, while at the same time
declaring, "The mere exclusion of the confession to my mind does
not exclude the evidence secured by the People as a result of it."109
Testimony and photographs relating to the finding of the dismembered
remains of the murder victim were claimed to be the fruits of the
confession.
10124 S.E.2d at 877.
0a State v. Young, 351 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. 1961). The court assumed for purposes
of decision that the confession had been "coerced", but expressed doubts as to
whether this was a fact.
"'People v. Williams, 225 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Ct. Gen. Sess., N.Y. County 1962).
I 695 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 US. 948 (1961).
"OId. at go. But see People v. Rand, 21 Cal. Rptr. 89 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
Files, J., dissented on ground that evidence presented to court was based on a
stipulation entered into by defense counsel.
2"95 Fad at 91.
2o Cal. Rptr. 05, 369 P.2d 714 962).m09 P.%d at 716.
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The evidence in the record, the Supreme Court of California
thought, showed the confession to have been voluntary, and not invol-
untary as ruled by the trial court. The court found it surprising, there-
fore, that the State did not challenge the ruling below, strongly indi-
cating that the State should do so in the future, since on a reversal
and retrial a confession ruled voluntary by the Supreme Court would
be admissible in evidence. The court also took note of legal and
psychiatric authorities who have recognized a compulsion on the part
of a perpetrator of a crime to confess, a phenomenon strikingly dem-
onstrated in the Ditson case when, following conviction, the defendant
who had confessed made a statement in writing to the trial judge in
which he said that he had admitted what he had done "because I
couldn't live with myself any more" and further, "The way I feel about
getting caught, is like a Blessing from heaven."110 In recognition of
this aspect of human nature, the court reaffirmed a previous statement,
"So long as the methods used comply with due process standards,
it is in the public interest for the police to encourage confessions and
admissions during interrogation."'
Nevertheless, the court continued to assume that the confession
was involuntary and properly excluded from evidence, in order to
examine the applicability of a fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
After reviewing the United States Supreme Court decisions in the
involuntary confession area, the court concluded that the doctrine of
"the admissibility of the product or 'fruits' of an involuntary confes-
sion has been rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States and
must be regarded as untenable." 1" 2 Although no U.S. Supreme Court
decision so holding was cited,13 the court announced the following
rule to be followed henceforth in California:
"[Tjhe reason for the common law rule permitting the in-
troduction of real evidence discovered by means of an invol-
untary confession-that such evidence tends to prove the 'trust-




raThe U.S. Supreme Court has never considered the question. Speaking with
reference to the admission into evidence of a coerced confession, whose truthfulness
has been established by corroborating evidence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Stein v. New York said, "But if law officers learn that from now on they
can coerce confessions without risk, since trial judges may admit such confessions
provided only that, perhaps through the very process of extorting them, other
evidence has been procured on which a conviction can be sustained, police in the
future even more so than in the past will take the easy but ugly path of the third
degree." 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953).
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tionally indefensible, and hence that the rule itself must be aban-
doned. The inquiry should instead be directed to the issue of
whether the introduction of the challenged evidence-the con-
fession itself or its asserted product-in a criminal 15rosecution
which culminated in a conviction denied the defendant, in the
particular circumstances of that case, any essential element
of a fair trial or due process of law."
114
In the Ditson case, the California Supreme Court recognized
"dangers inherent in the application" of a fruit of the poisonous tree
rule, and admonished the trial courts to exercise great care to deter-
mine: (i) that the confession is in fact involuntary; and (2) "that the
asserted 'fruits' of the confession thus found .to be involuntary were
in fact a product of that confession and would not have been otherwise
discovered by the police from information already in their possession
or independently acquired." 1 5 Two independently adequate bases
were found to render the rule inapplicable to the facts of the Ditson
case: (i) the defendant had not made timely object at the trial to the
admission of the "fruits" and (2) there were no "fruits." The first basis
is largely a makeweight of dubious value. 116 The second basis illustrates
the difficulties inherent in the rule.
The California rule does not require .the exclusion of all evidence
obtained on the basis of checking out an involuntary confession. Only
evidence that would not otherwise have been discovered by the police,
either from information already in their possession or from indepen-
dent sources, is to be excluded. In Ditson, as a result of the confession
the dismembered body of the victim was discovered, but this evidence
was held not to be the fruit of the confession, since every essential detail
of the crime and the identity of its perpetrators were already known to
the police, and the state was prepared to prosecute even though the
body of the victim was never found.1 17 Apparently also the implication
of another person in the crime is not a fruit of the confession if the
police already suspect his implication. 118
11 369 P.2d at 727.
11d. at 730.
216Cf. State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), examining into legality
of a search and seizure, even though no objection bad been made to the admission
of the evidence, "since the defense should not be charged with failing to anticipate
Mapp." 181 A.2d at 765. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the rule of
exclusion in the case in which the rule was announced.
n 7California has upheld a conviction of murder on wholly circumstantial
evidence, no body having been found. People v. Scott, 176 Cal. App. 2d 458, s Cal.
Rptr. 6oo, appeal dismissed (Douglas, J., dissenting), 364 U.S. 471 (196o).
raThe confession implicated Gerald and Wynston Longbrake, but the court
said this was not evidence but merely a "lead" in a process of investigation, since
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The New York Court of Appeals, without any particular discussion
of the point, impliedly rejected the fruit of the c, :3onous tree doc-
trine in People v. Roth.119 In this murder case th,.. efen.._. orally
confessed and then pointed out the place where he had hidden a
bloodstained rug and where the victim's coat could be found. The
New York Court of Appeals indicated that even though the confession
was held to be involuntary, "This does not mean that upon the re-
trial the People would be prevented from proving his identification
of objects claimed to have constituted circumstantial evidence of his
commission of the homicide."'
120
Professor Maguire' 2l has pointed out that there is a close relation-
ship between pretrial suppression of illegally-obtained evidence, and
the exclusion of other evidence obtained by use of the illegal evi-
dence. 22 While a majority of. the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in the case of In re Fried23 authorized pretrial suppression of in-
voluntary confessions obtained in violation of an accused person's
constitutional rights, 2 4 the decision has met with a "general lack of
enthusiasm" in other federal courts, 125 and appears to have been re-
jected by all the state courts that have considered the matter.126
"the police already knew of the various members of the Longbrake family (some
of whom had recently served time in prison) and of their possible connection with
the crime." 369 P.2d at 730-31
'"it N.Y.2d 8o, 226 N.YS..d 421, 181 N.E.2d 44o (1962).
M°18i N..2d at 444. The court was divided on the question of whether the
confession was involuntary. Only three of seven judges thought it was involuntary.
The statement quoted is from the opinion of the court, prepared by one of the
three judges who would have ruled the confession to be involuntary. All members
of the court agreed on reversing the conviction on another point.
mMaguire, supra note 87.
"mId. at 147-48.
"'x6i F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804 (1947), writ dismissed
on motion, 332 US. 807 (i947).
2"Judge Frank wrote the opinion of the court and would have sanctioned pre-
trial suppression of any confession obtained illegally, whether in violation of con-
stitutional rights or not; Judge Learned Hand agreed only to the extent of author-
izing pretrial suppression of involuntary confessions obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights. Judge Augustus Hand would not have authorized
pretrial suppression in either situation.
mCentracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 387-88 (ist Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 866 (1952); Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657, 659 (Ist Cir.
1954). One of the few cases, even in the federal courts, in which pretrial suppression
of a confession has been ordered is United States v. Skeeters, 122 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.
Cal. 1954.)
"'Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524, 526 (1938); McGee v. State,
230 Ind. 423, 104 N.E.2d 726, 728 (1952); State v. Cincenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568,
571 (1951); People v. Nentarz, 142 Misc. 477, 254 N.Y.S. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Application of Miller, 22 Misc. 2d 488, 193 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State
v. Olivieri, 86 R.I. 211, 133 A.2d 767, 768 (1957); Dominguez v. State, 275 S.W.2d
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It is too early to know the full effect that Mapp v. Ohio127 will
have on the present approach. It is significant, though, that the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Rodriguez128 has held that a pre-
trial motion to suppress may be used to exclude from consideration
a confession obtained as a product of an illegal search and seizure.
In this case the accused contended that he had been induced to con-
fess to certain killings by confrontation with a gun and other articles
illegally obtained 'rom his room. The court said:
"In short, the exclusion rule covers not only the evidence il-
legally obtained but the product of the unlawful search as
well .... And, obviously, it matters not that these 'fruits' happen
to be confessions rather than some other tjpe of evidence."'' 29
The logic of Judge Learned Hand's comment in the case of In
re Fried on the relationship between pretrial suppression of il-
legally-obtained evidence and illegally-obtained confessions seems
unanswerable. Referring to the procedures followed where viola-
tions of the fourth amendment were involved, Judge Hand said:
"Although, so far as I know, the same rule has not as yet been
extended to confessions procured in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, I feel too much the force of consistency not to take
this added step.... Since I cannot see any rational basis here
for distinguishing between the two Amendments when the situa-
tion is so nearly the same, I am content to accept this in-
novation." 130
There appears to be no more rational basis for distinguishing between
the fourth and fourteenth amendments than between the fourth and
fifth.
Presumably, any person who coerces an accused into an involun-
-tary confession in violation of his federal constitutional rights may
be punished in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act,131 but
the effectiveness of such a proceeding is dubious. The rationale of
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in both the confession cases and
in Mapp v. Ohio indicate that both a fruits of the poisonous tree
doctrine and pretrial suppression of involuntary confessions are in
the offing.
677, 678-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955); Walker v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 408, 286 S.W.2d
144, 149 (1955); cert. denied, 35 US. 931 (1956).
"13 6 7 US-. 643 (1961).
Imii N.Y.*xd 279, 183 NXE.2d 651 (t962).
3"183 N.E2d at 654.
m16i F.2d at 465."
IaSee supra, notes 8 and 9.
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In the confession cases, some version of the McNabb-Mallory rule,
under which even voluntary confession'. obtaine'" ;ring periods of
illegal detention are excluded from evidence,3' -  .,.quctliy urged
upon the state courts. 133 The rule, however, has been reject4d by the
state judiciaries almost without exception,134 although it finds some
support among state judges. 35 The opinions of the United States
Supreme Court in Culombe v. Connecticut'36 would indicate that the
matter is the subject of frequent debate within the Court. At least
two of the Justices are urging a broad right to counsel rule-"the right
to consult a lawyer before talking with the police"--that would ex-
clude many voluntary confessions obtained during periods of illegal
detention. 37 If this viewpoint is once accepted, it would be but a
short step to applying the full McNabb-Mallory rule 38 to the states.
III. CENTRALIZATION OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION
One important aspect of U.S. Supreme Court review of state
criminal proceedings has apparently never been noted in the confes-
sion cases. This is the fact that the administration of state criminal
justice, particularly when it is compared with the federal set-up, is
highly decentralized. The federal-state judicial systems constitute a
hierarchy, in which pronouncements at the top are made effective
throughout the system. Similarly federal executive enforcement of
criminal justice is centralized in the U.S. Department of Justice. This
centralization has been carried so far that certain federal crimes can-
not even be prosecuted without the "formal approval in writing by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, which function of approving prosecutions may not be dele-
gated."139
"'Maguire, supra note 87, at 155-66; Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. (1958).
mSee cases cited in note 92 supra.
'"In Culombe v. Connecticut, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that Michigan was
the only state to follow the McNabb rule, citing People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410,
1o2 N.W.2d 738 (196o). 367 U.S. n.51 at 6oi. People v. Roberts, supra note 93, may
cast some doubt on whether Michigan is following McNabb to the full extent.
"'Besides the Michigan cases cited supra note 134 see Dawson v. State, 139 So.
2d 408 (Fla. 1962); People v. Lane, io N.Y.2d 347, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d
197 (1961); State v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961).
" 367 U.S. 568 (1962).
"'Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black agrees, concurring. Id
at 637.
I'McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S g 449 (1957) AL'Ougitive Felon Act, 75 Stat. 795, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (1961 SuPp.).
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The decentralization of criminal justice at the state level is par-
ticularly apparent when one seeks information on state law enforce-
ment activities, such as subsequent developments in state confession
cases reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. To some
extent not precisely defined, the States' Attorneys General have rep-
resented the states in these cases before the Supreme Court. The
United States Reports indicate that in the twenty-two cases in which the
convictions were reversed, the states were represented by the State
Attorney General alone in nine cases, by the State Attorney General
and other attorneys in seven cases, and by attorneys not identified as
being associated with the State Attorney General in six cases. The
survey made in this article shows that many State Attorney General
Offices do not maintain records on what happens subsequent to re-
mands from the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General for New York,
for example, writes, "Criminal prosecutions in this State are handled
by the County District Attorneys and not by the Attorney General.
Consequently, this office has no record whatsoever of further proceed-
ings in these cases."'
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The Attorney General of the United States can adopt rules, which
will carry out the directives of the federal judiciary as laid down in con-
fession cases, and he may require federal law enforcement officials to
obey such rules. State Attorney Generals do not have such great
powers in relation to state and local enforcement officials.
The image of a soverign state being called to the bar of the U.S.
Supreme Court to answer for its administration of criminal justice is
largely an illusion. Formally, so far as the style of the case is concerned,
it is the state that prosecutes for crime. In proceedings before appellate
courts, state officials, in the name of the state, defend the criminal
convictions so obtained. The state as such may be castigated for its
techniques of law enforcement.
But law enforcement activities are carried out at a different level
and by different persons. While of course the situation varies through-
out the nation, generally there are no organized procedures by which
federal constitutional rules, as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
are made binding on local law enforcement officials. In fact, it is
doubtful if there is very much in the way of organized procedures for
even making the rules known to these officials.
A truly effective enforcement of federal constitutional rules re-
quires a great deal more than supervision by the federal judiciary of
1 1Letter from Hon. Paxton Blair, Solicitor General of New York, August 25,
sg6i.
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state criminal proceedings. There must be centralization of law en-
forcement activities, as well as judicial activities. This means there
must be a transfer of authority from the localities to the states, so that
the law enforcement activities of the states may be more easily sub-
jected to directions from the federal government. To state the remedy
also is to state the dangers inherent in the remedy. A centralized po-
lice system has great potentialities' for good, but it also has great po-
tentialities for evil.
A review of the state confession cases that have reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in the last quarter century, particularly an analysis of
the cases in which the Court reversed convictions, does not demon-
strate that the present situation is one of which the states need to be
ashamed. It would be a gross overstatement to say on the basis of this
review, that the number of innocent persons who have been convicted
by coerced confessions during the past quarter century equals the
number of fingers on one hand. Considering human fallibility, this is
hardly a bad record. Some lingering doubts must remain though as
to whether this truly states the picture, and whether the cases that
reach the U.S. Supreme Court have much to do with guilt or in-
nocence.1
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So far as protecting the innocent is concerned, a good case could be
made, as a preferable alternative to the present techniques, for the
complete abandonment of federal review of state confession cases and
the adoption by the states of a rule that a criminal conviction will be
reversed in an appellate court, unless two-thirds, or some such figure,
of the reviewing judges vote to affirm. So far as a review of these
confession cases shows, such a rule at the state level would more surely
have protected the innocent, than the present system of reversals only
by a majority even though the conviction is reviewed by a larger num-
ber of courts.
Herein must lie the basis for the major criticism that can be made
of federal judicial review of state criminal cases involving convictions.
The states, and particularly, the people in the local communities, are
not interested solely in constitutional guarantees. They are also in-
terested in protecting the innocent from unjust convictions. Federal
judicial review emphasizes the prevention of the unconstitutional
conviction of the guilty. An ideal system of criminal law administra-
tion gives first consideration to protecting the innocent.
""See Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 298-3oo (1961).
